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I. AN OVERVIEW
The United States, Canada, the European Union, Japan and most
industrialized nations have adopted patent, copyright and other
intellectual property laws. A major or primary purpose of those laws is to
foster innovation, including technological innovation. Industrial and
technological innovation is generally perceived as a good because
technological advances increase a society’s productivity,1 thus increasing
its wealth and raising living standards. The major industrialized nations
also possess competition laws, one of whose purposes is to preserve,
foster and support competitive markets. These nations want to preserve
competitive markets because competitive markets help to allocate
available resources to their highest valued uses and generate increased
productive efficiency, also helping to enrich society. 2 Since mid-century,
the United States, Canada, Europe, Japan and other nations have been
encouraging international trade, under the GATT and the WTO, by
progressively lowering their tariffs and eliminating other barriers to trade.
These efforts to promote freer trade help to allocate the world’s resources
more closely to their highest-valued uses, thereby increasing the aggregate
wealth of the entire world.
That all of the major industrialized nations pursue policies that
simultaneously support innovation, allocative efficiency and production
efficiency is to be expected. These policies all aim at the enrichment of
society. Since their underlying goals are similar, seeming conflicts in the
applications of these various laws are capable of being readily resolved.
1

See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare,
and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1020, 1026 (1987)(“. . . studies have shown that
over the forty-year period from the late 1920s to the late 1960s, at least half of the gain in United
States output was due solely to technological and scientific progress.”)
2
Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Alternative Merger Standards and the Prospects for
International Cooperation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 208, 210
(Daniel M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick, eds. 2002); Daniel J. Gifford & Mitsuo Matsushita,
Antitrust or Competition Laws Viewed in a Trading Context: Harmony or Dissonance? in 2 FAIR
TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 269, 277-79 (Jagdish N.
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec, eds.1996).
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Resort to the common element---welfare maximization---underlying them
should aid immensely in construing their provisions and in selecting those
interpretations which best harmonize apparent conflicts in their
provisions.
Despite the common welfare-advancing goals embodied in the
intellectual property laws, competition laws and trade policies of these
jurisdictions, every jurisdiction has deviated from those goals on occasion.
In this paper, I examine several places where the innovation-fostering
goals of the intellectual property laws have been undercut by legislatures
or courts. The examples come from the United States, Canada, and the
European Union. In many of these examples, I have been able to compare
approaches taken to similar problems in different jurisdictions, thus
providing a comparative-law aspect to this exploration of deviations from
intellectual-property goals.
The paper examines Canadian and U.S. approaches to the
protection of patented pharmaceutical products in Part II. Then, in Part
III, it explores the treatment of patented pharmaceutical products within
the European Union in the context of differing national policies governing
pricing and patent incentives. In Part IV it examines European and U.S.
approaches to the patenting of dna and proteins. In Part V, the paper
explores judicial approaches to the protection of computer programs.
Finally, in Part VI, the paper examines aspects of U.S. intellectual-property
misuse law and related issues of antitrust law as they are emerging in
Europe and the United States. In each instance, the paper attempts to
draw conclusions about the welfare effects of the policies examined.
II. THE PATENT REGIME, PHARMACEUTICALS, PRICING, AND DIFFERING
NATIONAL INTERESTS: THE CANADIAN AND U.S. APPROACHES TO
PHARMACEUTICALS.
Patent law is designed to stimulate inventive activity by conferring
on inventors a period of exclusive rights in their inventions. In doing so, it
incorporates several elements: the insight and skill of the inventor in
identifying a societal need or want; the patent law itself that provides the
means for the inventor to capture some of the invention’s economic value;
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and the market as a means for directing the inventor’s efforts to identify
products that will meet social needs. 3 Pharmaceutical patents, like all
patents, are designed to enable their holders to exploit the present market
for society’s long-term benefit. Because they cover products that affect
health, this latent conflict is more likely to be realized in government
policies that give added weight to short term interests. The attraction of
the short-term to policy-makers, however, may be partially offset by the
existence of a domestic pharmaceutical industry.
These factors suggest that we should expect that legal regimes
would differ in the respect they accord to pharmaceutical patents.
Monopoly-level pharmaceutical prices may provide a stimulus to research
and development, but the incentive-to-innovation rationale of the patent
system is more easily accepted in nations with a domestic pharmaceutical
industry. In those nations, the relationship between the patent system and
the beneficial societal effects reflected in the generation of new medical
products is reinforced when the public is aware of a thriving domestic
industry that is dependent upon that system. It is true, of course, that
innovative drugs are sold worldwide, so that the benefits of patentstimulated research are widely available. But the additional factor that the
system also supports a domestic industry sometimes makes the system
more politically acceptable.
A. Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals in Canada.
Canada provides a somewhat more interesting example of the two
faces of intellectual property protection in the pharmaceutical industry.
Canada is a highly developed nation, an economy integrated into the
global economic system and even more heavily integrated with its trading
partners in North America. It has a domestic pharmaceutical industry,
albeit one that is largely composed of branches of foreign multinationals.
These multinationals perform a significant amount of research activity in
Canada. So Canada experiences conflicting pressures. It would like to
3

The patent system incorporates the advantages and disadvantages of the market. One of its
deficiencies relating to the development of pharmaceutical products is that it stimulates the
development of drugs useful in treating diseases common in developed nations and is not
responsive to the needs of poorer societies. See Daniel J. Gifford, How Do the Social Costs and
Benefits of the Patent System Stack Up in Pharmaceuticals? (forthcoming).
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encourage the expansion of its domestic pharmaceutical industry, and it
would also like to reduce the amounts that it pays for new
pharmaceuticals.
Although Canada has always had an effective patent system, it
historically has accorded a lesser level of protection for pharmaceuticals
products than for other subject matter. In 1923, Parliament amended the
Patent Act to provide for compulsory patent licenses for the production of
drugs in Canada.4 Under this legislated scheme, independent Canadian
manufacturers would produce generic equivalents of patented drugs for a
set royalty, usually 4% of sales.5 Although this legislation was intended to
foster competition among drug manufacturers that would drive down the
prices of drugs, it achieved only limited success. During the four and onehalf decades following the amendment, only 49 compulsory licenses were
sought and only 22 licenses were authorized by the Commissioner of
Patents.6 Canadian sources attribute the small number of licenses to the
small size of the Canadian market being unable to sustain the numerous
manufacturing facilities envisioned by the 1923 legislators.7 To overcome
this hurdle, the Act was further amended in 1969 to extend compulsory
licensing to imported drugs.8 The authorities that claim that the Canadian
market was too small to sustain generic drug manufacturing nevertheless
report that the 1969 legislation helped to generate a domestic generic drug
industry.
Despite the apparent success of the revised compulsory licensing
system, Parliament came to take the view that compulsory licensing
discouraged research and development in Canada.9 Accordingly, it

Act, S.C. 1923, c.23, § 187. See Joel Lexchin, After Compulsory Licensing: Coming
Issues in Canadian Pharmaceutical Policy and Politics, 40 HEALTH POLICY 69, 70 (1997).
5ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Patented Medicine Prices Review Bd., [1996] 138 D.L.R.4th
71, 76; Patricia I. Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States amd
Canada, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 215, 241 (1999).
6See Lexchin, supra note 4 at 70.
7See Lexchin, supra note 4 at 70. See also ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Patented Medicine
Prices Review Bd., supra note 5 at 75.
8See Act to Amend the Patent Act, the Trade Marks Act & the Food & Drugs Act, S.C.
1968_69, ch. 49, § 1 (1968) (Can.).
9ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Patented Medicine Prices Review Bd., supra note 5 at 76.
4Patent
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enacted legislation in 198710 that deferred the entry of generic licensees for
periods of seven to twenty years. The patentees, however, although
released from the competition of generics for at least seven years, were not
free to price as they saw fit. During the period in which they were free
from competition, the patentees’ prices were made subject to control by
the Patented Medicine Prices Review Board. Despite the price control,
however, research and development investment increased substantially,
rising from 6.1% of sales in 1988 to 11.8% in 1995.11
The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) required a number of changes in the Canadian patent law.
Canada, like the United States, had previously observed a patent term of
17 years from the date that a patent issued. NAFTA obligated its
adherents to observe a patent term of 20 years from the date of filing.12 It
also placed severe limits on compulsory licensing.13 In anticipation of
NAFTA, the Parliament eliminated the compulsory-licensing system in
1993 and changed the patent term to 20 years from filing.14 Later, the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS Agreement) imposed similar obligations.15
Both the United States and Canada have enacted legislation
designed to ease the entry into the market by generic drug manufacturers.
In the United States this legislation was combined with legislation to
restore some of the patent term which is effectively taken from drug
patentees by the lengthy period in which an already patented drug must
await regulatory approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
before it can be marketed. In the Waxman-Hatch Act, adopted in 1984,
Congress authorized patent term extensions to compensate for this
waiting period.16
10S.C.

1987, c. 41.
supra note 4 at 71.
12NAFTA, Art. 1709(12).
13NAFTA, Art. 1709(10).
14An Act to Amend the Patent Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 2, § 3, Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P_4, § 39
(1997).
15TRIPS Agreement, Art. 31 (limitations on compulsory licensing); Art 33 (patent term).
16The Hatch-Waxman Act permits extensions of the patent term equal to the time in
which the patentee awaited final FDA approval plus one half of the post-patent-issuance
time taken for running clinical tests. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(1), (2). The period so calculated
11Lexchen,
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The Waxman-Hatch Act also eased the entry of generic
manufacturers by allowing them, during the patent term, to use the
patented drug to prepare their own submissions to the FDA.17 They
cannot submit their application for approval, however, until the patent
term expires.18 Perhaps even more important, the Act permits
manufacturers of generic drugs to piggy-back on the research of the
producer of the original (or “pioneer”) drug and encourages them to
challenge the patent and its coverage. Under the Act, a generic drug
manufacturer is permitted to file an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA) which incorporates the data previously supplied by the pioneerdrug producer. In addition, the generic manufacturer must certify
information about the patent status of the pioneer drug: either that no
patent has been issued; that the patent has expired; that the patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the generic drug. If the generic
manufacturer certifies that the pioneer drug patent is invalid or will not be
infringed (“paragraph IV certification”), the manufacturer of the pioneer
drug is given 45 days to bring a patent infringement suit. The
commencement of the patent action then triggers a stay on the approval of
the generic for thirty months or until the court rules on the issues of patent
validity and/or infringement.
Waxman-Hatch further incorporates incentives to attract generic
manufactuers into the market. The first generic to qualify under the
paragraph IV certification provisions is rewarded with a quasi-exclusivity:
a 180-day period in which it shares the market only with the patentee, no
other generics being permitted to enter during that period. Thus WaxmanHatch carries provisions designed both to reinforce the incentives to
innovate by restoring at least some of the patent term whose usefulness is
lost to regulatory delays and to provide incentives to generics to challenge
or avoid existing patents.

when added to the remaining patent term, however, cannot exceed fourteen years. 35
U.S.C. § 156(c)(3). And no extension can exceed five years. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A).
1735 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). This provision overrules Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1835 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2000).
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Canadian legislation, enacted in 1993, followed some, but not all, of
the path marked out by Waxman-Hatch. The Canadian legislation
followed the part of the Waxman-Hatch Act that authorized generic
producers, during the patent term, to use a patented drug to prepare their
own regulatory submissions.19 The Canadian regulations also followed
several of the Waxman-Hatch procedures. Canadian regulations permit
generic producers to piggy-back on the research supporting the pioneer
drug,20 and they establish procedures through which generic producers
may challenge the validity or scope of pioneer patents.21 The Canadian
law and regulations, however, differed from Waxman-Hatch in their
omission of provisions for extending the patent term that compensate the
pioneer firms for regulatory delays. Although the Canadian legislation
also omitted the incentive of the quasi-exclusive periods given to first
generic challengers, it took another route towards making generics more
available. It authorized generic producers to stockpile generic drugs in
readiness for the expiration of the patent.22 Indeed these differences in the
Canadian legislation are interrelated. The Parliament’s decision not to
provide for a patent-term extension to compensate for regulatory delays
appears related to its decision to allow stockpiling, in that in combination
these decisions erode the patentee’s protections at both ends of the patent
term. The regulatory delay makes the patent commercially unusable
during its early years, the omission of patent-term extension ensures that
the protected period is shortened by the full amount of the regulatory
delay, and the stockpiling provision means that generic manufacturers
will be ready to enter the market with a full inventory at the end of the
patent term, thus denying the patentee even the compensation afforded
by the preparation time necessary for its generic rivals to enter the market.
The European Union challenged the stockpiling legislation before
the World Trade Organization as inconsistent with Canada’s obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement. In its challenge, the EU contended that the
stockpiling legislation was properly seen in the context of Canada’s
decision not to provide patent-term extensions to compensate for
19Patent

Act § 55.2(1).
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations § 5(1).

20Patented
21Id.
22Patent

Act § 55.2 (repealed). 2001 Annual Statutes of Canada, Ch. 10 (Bill S-17).
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regulatory delays. The EU prevailed in its challenge to the stockpiling
provision.23 The EU failed, however, in an accompanying challenge to the
provision allowing generics to use patented products to prepare their
cases for regulatory approval. As a result of the EU’s successful WTO
challenge to the stockpiling provision, the Canadian Parliament repealed
it.
The successful EU challenge to the Canadian stockpiling provision
reveals the interrelations among the several welfare-enhancing policies
identified above. When the Canadian Parliament shortened the effective
term of pharmaceutical patents, it put the short-run interest of Canadian
residents ahead of the longer-term world-wide goal of stimulating
innovation in pharmaceutical products. From a purely domestic
perspective, this position makes sense. The Canadian market is
sufficiently small that a reduction of the patent term to pharmaceutical
producers would not significantly affect their incentives to innovation. (Of
course, if the Canadian example were followed by many other
jurisdictions, their incentives might be affected.) So by enforcing the rules
even in the case of a breach that in itself would not have undermined the
worldwide intellectual property system, the EU helped to ensure that the
Canadian deviation would not be repeated. Moreover, the EU’s challenge
also highlighted the fact that the TRIPs Agreement was part of the overall
WTO trade agreement. By providing protection to the intellectual
property that is currently the comparative advantage of developed
nations, it helps ensure their cooperation in continuing movement
towards freer trade under the WTO.
B. A Economic and Political Perspective on the Canadian Patent Law
Modifications.
When the United States and Canada imposed time-consuming
regulatory responsibilities upon their pharmaceutical regulatory
authorities (the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and Health Canada),
the result was that the effective period of patent protection for
pharmaceutical products was reduced, because patentees could not
23REPORT

OF THE PANEL CANADA - PATENT PROTECTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS,
March 17, 2000, 2000 WL 301021 WT/DS114/R.
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legally market those products during the initial years of the patent period
when they were still awaiting regulatory approval. This effective
reduction of the patent period reduced the potential profits of patentees,
with a concomitant reduction of incentives. As we observed above, the
U.S. Congress responded to this reduction of the patent period at the
beginning by legislating a compensatory extension at the end of the
period. The legislation extending the patent term did not fully compensate
for the initial reduction in the patent term, because protection at the end of
the term is prima facie less valuable than protection at the beginning,
because the innovation-inducing function of the patent system is premised
upon the system’s incentive effects. And the incentive effects take place
from the viewpoint of the potential innovator, prior to its commitment of
assets to its research activities. That viewpoint, accordingly, assesses
potential future profits discounted to their value at the time when assets
are committed to research, i.e., at the beginning. In short, the
compensatory patent-term extension replaces years of high value
protection with years of low value protection. In addition, the Congress
also placed some limits on the extension: no extension can exceed five
years and the total period encompassed by the remaining patent term plus
the extension period cannot exceed fourteen years.24 So the compensatory
extension patently does not fully compensate for the loss due to
regulatory review. The legislation permitting generic competitors to
piggy-back on the research of the pioneer and providing them permission
to produce the materials necessary to obtain regulatory approval, of
course, also somewhat shortens the patentee’s effective period of
exclusivity.
The effects of the U.S. patent-term extension legislation can be
illustrated as follows. We assume that the approval of the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) takes 2 years and that FDA approval takes an
additional 4 years. Although all patentees must incur a wait for approval,
patentees other than pharmaceutical companies are free to market their
products during the waiting period. Because a pharmaceutical company
cannot market its product without FDA approval, it must seek approval
from both the PTO and the FDA and may not market its product until it
has obtained the latter’s approval. In the example, in which the
24

35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2000).
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pharmaceutical company loses 2 years to the PTO and 4 years to the FDA,
the Congress has provided for a patent-term extension for the 4 years
involved in waiting for the FDA approval.
Assume further that patent revenues are a constant amount ($m)
for each year in which the product is marketed. The company’s revenues
for this product then–in the absence of a patent-term extension–would be
as follows:
year 1
year 2
year 3
year 4
year 5

return
-0-0-0-0-0-

year 6
year 7
year 8
year 9
year 10

return
-0$m
$m
$m
$m

year 11
year 12
year 13
year 14
year 15

return
$m
$m
$m
$m
$m

year 16
year 17
year 18
year 19
year 20

return
$m
$m
$m
$m
$m

The patent-term extension changes the revenue picture to the following:
year 1
year 2
year 3
year 4
year 5

Return
return
-0
year 6
-0-0year 7 $m
-0year 8 $m
-0year 9 $m
-0year 10 $m

year 11
year 12
year 13
year 14
year 15

return
$m
$m
$m
$m
$m

year 16
year 17
year 18
year 19
year 20

return
$m
$m
$m
$m
$m

year 21
year 22
year 23
year 24

$m
$m
$m
$m

The returns from years 21 through 24 are intended to compensate the
patentee for the effective loss of the years 3 through 6. But however well
intentioned, the legislation does not provide an effective scheme of
compensation, given the purposes of the patent law to promote
innovation. Had the patentee been permitted to exploit its patent in years
3 through 6, its expected profits in those years would have a substantially
higher value than the expected profits from years 21 through 24, the years
of the patent-term extension.
The patent law promotes innovation by providing the prospect of
an economic reward to the innovator. The structure of this incentive
mechanism requires that the reward be assessed at the beginning, i.e., at
the time that the innovator decides to commit resources to the research
effort that it hope ultimately to culminate in a successful product,
producing a stream of revenues that compensates it for its research costs
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and the risks involved, and, in addition, produces a profit. It is at this
initial period that the innovator weighs the risks against the potential
revenue stream. Thus the projected revenue stream must be discounted to
its present value as of the commencement of the project.
Restating the revenue stream in terms of the present discounted
value of the future revenue stream, it looks like this:
year 1 -0year 2 -0year 3 -0year 4 -0year 5 -0year 6 -0year 7 $m/(1+r)7
year 8 $m/(1+r)8

year 9 $m/(1+r)9
year 10 $m/(1+r)10
year 11 $m/(1+r)11
year 12 $m/(1+r)12
year 13 $m/(1+r)13
year 14 $m/(1+r)14
year 15 $m/(1+r)15
year 16 $m/(1+r)16

year 17 $m/(1+r)17
year 18 $m/(1+r)18
year 19 $m/(1+r)19
year 20 $m/(1+r)20
year 21 $m/(1+r)21
year 22 $m/(1+r)22
year 23 $m/(1+r)23
year 24 $m/(1+r)24

The present value of years 21 through 24 are substantially less than the
present value of years 3 through 6, as is apparent from the higher valued
exponent on the denominator (and thus the greater the denominator and
the lower value of the entire term). The extension compensates high value
years with low value years:
year 3

$m/(1+r)3

>

year 21

$m/(1+r)21

year 4

$m/(1+r)4

>

year 22

$m/(1+r)22

year 5

$m/(1+r)5

>

year 23

$m/(1+r)23

year 6

$m/(1+r)6

>

year 24

$m/(1+r)24

The Waxman-Hatch extension thus suggests that it compensates
patentees, but in fact does not. It is puzzling why Congress legislated in a
way that obscured its decision to undercompensate pharmaceutical
patentees.25 The answer may lie in the complex political context in which
25Congress

sometimes legislates in ways that create the appearance that it is legislating
for the benefit of the larger society while it actually casts the legislation in terms that
benefit organized lobbying groups. See, e.g., MURRAY J. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF
POLITICS 40 (1964).
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this legislation was enacted. The pharmaceutical companies wanted
compensation for the effective loss of the early years of the patent term
due to the FDA regulatory delay, but they probably deemed it politically
impractical to ask for full compensation, since that would have entailed an
extension period greater than the delay. Moreover, they would be
opposed by consumer groups, focusing on the short-term welfare of their
members who would have ridiculed an analysis that reduced the value of
the extension years to their present value. In that context, Congress was
responding to the pressures of both groups. The legislation both gives to
the pharmaceutical companies (by extending the patent term) and takes
from them (by fostering patent challenges and the entry of generics). That
was probably the best that the pharmaceutical companies could obtain.
An analysis of the corresponding Canadian law is more
straightforward. The absence of a powerful research-based
pharmaceutical industry meant that the Canadian Parliament faced
pressure from just the consumer direction. The logic of arguments based
upon future global benefits engendered by patent protection is likely to
succumb to the demands of consumer groups asserting their present
interest in lower drug prices. The short-term interests of Canadians is
furthered when the rights of pharmaceutical companies are curtailed. The
actions of Parliament and the Health Minister in the several actions that
curtailed the patent rights of the pharmaceutical companies (denial of
patent-term extension and stockpiling) are thus unproblematic. They
become more problematic when they are assessed against the standard of
global long-term welfare. But the democratic political process is less likely
to produce an optimum result when it addresses long-term welfare. And
it is even less likely to respond optimally to global welfare concerns, at
least when global welfare is not an exact match to domestic welfare.
III. THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: AN UNRESOLVED DILEMA
Within the European Union the interplay between the treaty
provision protecting the free movement of goods,26 varying terms of
26Article

28 (former Article 30).
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intellectual property protection, the exhaustion doctrine, and varying
regulatory controls has made significant inroads upon the incentive
structure of intellectual property laws. Because the pharmaceutical
companies have been subjected to different degrees of regulation in the
several nations within the European Union, they have borne an especially
heavy burden. In the early years of the Common Market, many European
nations did not recognize patents over pharmaceutical products. Patents
rights over pharmaceutical products were recognized in the United
Kingdom and Ireland in the case and statute law well prior to the
establishment of the Treaty of Rome.27 But that was not true for most other
European countries. Germany recognized pharmaceutical patents only in
1967, Italy in 1978, Denmark in 1983, Norway in 1992, Greece in 1992,
Spain in 1992, and Finland in 1995.28 Although all of the member nations
now provide patent protection to pharmaceutical products, the market for
these products has been, and continues to be, subject to various kinds of
government intervention. As a result prices vary substantially from
country to country. These substantial price variations help to create the
conditions for arbitrage.
The wide range of drug prices was illustrated in Merck & Co. v.
Stephar BV.29 That case involved large scale purchases of a pharmaceutical
product in a low-price national market and resales in a high-price market.
The particular drug involved was a one for the treatment of hypertension
on which Merck held patents. Merck marketed it under the trademark
“Moduretic.” Evidence submitted by the defendant in that case showed
price variations among 7 countries. Taking the price in the Federal
Republic of Germany as a reference price at 100, the prices in other nations
patents were recognized in the UK in Acetylene Illuminating Co. v. United
Alkali Co. [1905] R.P.C. 145, 153, and in the Patents Act 1949, § 4(7). Ireland recognized
such patents in its Patents Act 1964, § 2. Prior to that time the Irish courts may have been
influenced on this issue by the House of Lords decision in Acetylene Illuminating Co. ,
supra, which was rendered prior to Irish independence. See Merck v. Primecrown Ltd,
(C-267/95 & 268/95) [1996] E.C.R. 6285, 6317-18, para. 79 & n.64. (opinion of Advocate
General).
28See Merck v. Primecrown Ltd, supra note 27 at 6317-18, para. 79 & nn.64-69. The history
of Italian patent protection is discussed in Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, (187/80) [1981]
E.C.R. 2063, 2065.
29(187/80) [1981] E.C.R. 2063.
27Pharmaceutical
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were: Netherlands 140; Denmark 76; Belguim 102; United Kingdom 58;
France 51; Italy 56.30 The low prices in France were apparently due to
price control exerted by the French government.31 The low prices in the
United Kingdom apparently were the result of government market
interventions.
The basic structure of the law governing the arbitraging of patented
pharmaceutical products was established in 1974 in Centrafarm BV v.
Sterling Drug Inc, 32 well before universal recognition was accorded to
patents on these products. That case involved patents owned by Sterling
Drug, Inc., a New York corporation on a product (acidum nalidixicum)
used for treatment of infections of the urinary passages and marketed
under the trademark “Negram.” Sterling owned patents in the UK and in
the Netherlands. As in the case of many drugs, prices in the UK were
substantially less than in the Netherlands. Indeed, the UK price was one
half of the Netherlands price.33 Prices were also lower in Germany than
they were in the Netherlands. Centrafarm purchased this drug in the UK
and in Germany and shipped it to the Netherlands where it resold it at
higher prices. Sterling sought to bar Centrafarm from importing the
product into the Netherlands on the ground that its Netherlands patent
rights gave it exclusive control over the product in that country. Sterling’s
position was rejected, however, by the Court of Justice which ruled that
Sterling’s patent rights over the particular products subsequently
imported into the Netherlands were exhausted when it or its subsidiaries
sold them in the UK and in Germany.34 Indeed, exhaustion is a corollary
of the treaty provision guaranteeing the free movement of goods. Once a
30

[1981] E.C.R. at 2075.
VALENTINE KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 261 (7th ed. 2000).
32(15/74) [1974] E.C.R. 1147.
33[1974] E.C.R. at 1149.
34 The rule that a patentee’s rights over a particular physical product are exhausted after
that product has been is observed in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Cyrix Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 846 F.Supp. 522, 538 (E.D. Tex.), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (applying
exhaustion doctrine in the United States. A national court ruling that patent rights over a
particular physical product were exhausted by a sale within that nation is applying a
doctrine of domestic exhaustion. A court ruling that patent rights over a physical product
were exhausted by a sale abroad is applying a doctrine of international exhaustion
Commentators sometimes to the Court of Justice applying a rule of international
exhaustion. Although this is technically true, the Union itself is analogous to a federation
in which “domestic” jurisdiction extends throughout the federation.
31See
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person acquires title to goods, that person is free to sell them throughout
the European Union. And that right of resale includes goods subject to
intellectual property rights, so long as the rights holder has authorized
their initial sale. Sterling’s second line of attack, against Centrafarm was
based on trademark. Sterling contended that it had the exclusive right
over the Negram trademark in the Netherlands and that this right was
infringed when Centrafarm imported Negram-branded drugs into that
nation. Sterling again lost on similar reasoning by the Court. Once a
product is sold with the consent of the trademark owner, the purchaser is
free to resell it any place in the European Union.35
Later the Court reached a similar decision in Merck & Co. v. Stephar
In this case, it was the absence of patent protection in Italy that
caused the problem for Merck. Merck sold its drug (Moduretic) in Italy
even though it had been unable to secure patent protection there. At the
time the case was decided, Italy had restored patent protection for
pharmaceuticals,37 but the restoration was too late for Merck’s product
which was then in widespread public use. Stephar BV, an importer,
purchased Moduretic in Italy and resold it at higher prices in the
Netherlands, undercutting Merck. Like Sterling in the earlier case, Merck
wanted to employ its Netherlands patent to bar the imports from Italy.
Although Merck had hoped that because no patent protection was
available in Italy, the Court would distinguish Centrafarm, its hopes were
disappointed. The Court ruled that treaty provision guaranteeing the free
movement of goods throughout the Community prevented the patent law
of any member state from barring the importation of those goods. In
essence, the Court told Merck that if it chose to sell its goods in Italy
where there was no patent protection, then it had to bear the
consequences. Later decisions have refined these rules, holding, for
example, that exhaustion will not destroy a patentee’s right to exclude
BV.36

35Centrafarm

BV v. Winthrop BV, (16/74) [1974] E.C.R. 1183.
note 27 supra.
37Indeed, Italy had abolished patent protection over pharmaceuticals in 1939. Article
14(1) of the Italian Patent Law (Royal Decree of 29 June 1939, No. 1127). Italy did not
reinstate such protection until 1978, when the Italian Constitutional Court invalidated the
earlier law. See discussion in Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, (187/80) [1981] E.C.R. 2063,
2065.
36See
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products that the importer has obtained unlawfully or without the consent
of the patentee. Centrafarm was reaffirmed by the Court of Justice in its
1996 decision in Primecrown.38
Primecrown involved the purchase of pharmaceutical products sold
by Merck in Spain and Portugal at a time before those countries offered
patent protection to pharmaceuticals and their resale in the United
Kingdom. Merck sought to bar the importation of the products from Spain
and Portugal by invoking its UK patent rights. In its argument, Merck
contended that the lack of patent protection in those countries exerted a
depressing effect on prices, thus exacerbating its exposure to arbitrage.
The Advocate General, however, recognized that this argument had wider
implications: that its logic would ultimately apply to the lower prices
compelled by government price controls and other market interventions.
His request that the Court overrule Centrafarm broadly can perhaps be
understood in that light.
Critics have charged that the application of the exhaustion doctrine
by the Court of Justice have undermined the incentive function of the
patent laws, as they apply to pharmaceuticals. Valentine Korah sees it
anomalous that while the Council of the European Union is trying to
strengthen intellectual property protection, the Court of Justice is reducing
that protection through its reaffirmation of the Centrafarm line of
decisions.39 Korah is concerned that this line of decisions frustrates
patentees from earning the rewards that the patent system promises and
accordingly undermines its incentive structure. In asking the Court to
overrule Centrafarm in the Primecrown case, the Advocate General took a
similar line of argument. Critics have further charged that the Centrafarm
rule forces the national policy that is least protective to the pharmaceutical
companies upon the other nations, thus engendering a kind of race to the
bottom in intellectual property protection.
In the critics view, the Court has ignored the different commercial
realities between patented pharmaceutical products and other products.
The interpretative path taken by the Court of Justice encourages arbitrage.
Generally this makes sense. Strict application of Article 28 to all commerce
38Merck

& Co. v. Primecrown Ltd, (C-267/95 & C-268/95) [1996] E.C.R. I-6285.
KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 278 (7th ed. 2000).

39VALENTINE
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assists in the erosion of national barriers and the creation of a common
market. Here arbitrage (now aided by the Euro as a common currency that
increases the visibility of price differences) helps to erode separate
national markets. But the intensive (and inconsistent) regulation applied
by the member nations to pharmaceuticals itself helps to generate separate
markets for those products. The strict application of Article 28 to
pharmaceuticals would only make sense if the EU also sought to adopt a
common policy on price control and similar market interventions for
pharmaceutical products. A common price control policy would produce
a common, albeit regulated, market. Alternatively, an unregulated free
market in each nation would also produce a EU wide common market. In
either case, arbitrage would disappear.
But the EU has taken neither position. It is apparently willing to
live with a system in which pharmaceutical products are subject to
differing national policies and consequently are sold in different national
markets. As a result, in the view of the critics, the Court appears to be
applying an exhaustion doctrine in a way that serves no purpose at all.
Article 28 generally helps to create a common market in most
(unregulated) goods. But a strict application of Article 28 to products like
pharmaceuticals that are subject to differing systems of national
regulation appears to undermine the marketing of the patentees without
an underlying justification. At least, that is the charge that is made by
some critics. It is true that the pharmaceutical companies are learning to
operate within this system. Companies such as Bayer have begun limiting
their sales to distributors within each member state to their estimates of
national consumption. Combined with member-state requirements that
local distributors maintain stocks adequate for national needs, this policy
effectively impedes arbitrage. The Court of Justice has just ruled that this
practice is lawful under Article 81(1) under a European version of the
Colgate doctrine, since no concerted action is involved.40 The limited
ability of the companies to avoid the consequences of a Community policy
fostering arbitrage, however, does not provide a rationale for an internal
trade policy that appears designed to undermine the intellectual property
policies of the member states. Why do not the EU authorities take steps to

40

Bayer AG v. Commission of the European Communities, EU Case C-2/01; EU Case
3/01, ECJ Jan. 6 2004.
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bring their trade, intellectual property and helath-care policies into
alignment?
Lets consider the EU Centrafarm rule in the light of the incentive
structure of patent (and other intellectual property) law. That rule
certainly facilitates arbitrage and thus may help to undermine the
patentee’s prices in a high-price market. Thus if we were to take the
position that overall welfare is furthered when the patent mechanism
fosters pharmaceutical research, we would favor the overruling of
Centrafarm. This is a strong anti-Centrafarm position based upon the longterm welfare effects of patent law. But if we took that position, we would
also want to abolish interventions in the market by governments through
price control or other devices designed to hold pharmaceutical prices to
low levels. But that position is a policy position that would be politically
justified only by viewing the aggregate interests of the EU as a whole
(rather than the separate interests of the individual nations composing it).
Any one nation, especially smaller ones without a domestic
pharmaceutical industry, may find that its interest is in ensuring low
prices in the present. The incentive effect of high prices in that country
alone is minimal. Thus on a balance between longrun welfare and present
welfare, the balance for such a nation falls on the side of maximizing
present or short-term welfare. Since the nations of the EU do not agree on
pharmaceutical policy, there is no EU-wide option. It follows that each
constituent nation must be free to follow its own interest.
A tentative conclusion thus emerges. There can be no EU-wide
policy on pharmaceuticals because the interests of the member states are
not in alignment. In order for a common policy to emerge the member
states would have to engage in significant bargaining, trading off some
interests in pharmaceutical policy for compensating benefits in other
areas. This might be done at one of the periodic revisions of the Treaty or
perhaps through the Council. In the meantime, all parties have to live
with the existing policy differences. But, given these policy differences,
should the least protective national policy be allowed to undermine the
more protective national policies? Or should the nations with the more
protective policies be allowed to preserve them against the undermining
potential of arbitrage? The latter position is a weak anti-Centrafarm
position: it favors the overruling of Centrafarm not on substantive policy
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grounds but on the ground of protecting national autonomy. If we opt for
the latter position (which is the position of the critics and the Advocate
General), then do we give up on the goal of a common market for
pharmaceuticals? That is, do we recognize that the Centrafarm rule is
merely a symbolic but an ineffective gesture towards that end? I suggest
that there is a middle ground: one that recognizes the policy differences
among the member states of the European Union and at the same time
recognizes the importance of fostering a common market among all
products, including pharmaceuticals. To make the case for this third
position, I draw from the U.S. experience, comparing the law and
economics prevailing in the United States with the situation within the
European Union.
The doctrine of international exhaustion applied in the European
Union appears similar (albeit not identical) to the approach of the U.S.
courts. Thus the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that trademarked items
sold abroad by a U.S. enterprise or its subsidiaries or licensees can be
lawfully imported into the United States.41 A similar rule applies to
copyrighted goods.42 Although the law appears less clear in the case of
patents, there is ground for believing that the same rule applies to the
importation into the United States of patented goods produced with the
consent of the U.S. patentee.43 Goods, however, that have been produced
under a patent license in which the license terms confine the rights
conferred upon the licensee to a specific geographic area may be treated
differently. It is clear that a patentee may restrict a license geographically,
and the law specifically contemplates assignments of geographical
rights.44 But it remains unclear whether a purchaser from a licensee or
assignee of geographical limited rights who has purchased the patented
product abroad may import the product into the United States. Yet this
problem is perhaps more theoretical than real, because U.S. patent owners
could minimize the prospect of importation by forbidding their foreign

41K

Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
43Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266 F. 71, 72-73 (2d
Cir. 1920).
44 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
42Quality
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licensees to sell to purchasers who refuse to provide assurances that they
will not ship to the United States.45
The European and U.S. laws are also similar in their provisions
dealing with the free movement of goods within their jurisdiction. The
EU’s Article 28 that bars quantative restrictions on imports by member
states has a parallel in the commerce clause of the U.S. constitution46 that
prevents the states of the United States from barring imports from other
states.47 The purpose of both provisions is the same: the establishment of a
“common market”48 throughout the larger jurisdiction.
Despite the similarities, the U.S. law differs significantly from the
European law in its impact. While the United States and Europe appear to
apply the exhaustion doctrine in a similar manner, the presence in the
European Union of different national markets that result in part from
differing regulatory regimes has no parallel in the United States. While
there are differences in the structure of health insurance among the states
of the United States and minor differences in the regulation of healthcare
providers, these differences do not appear to have generated separate
geographical markets for pharmaceutical products. This is not to say that
all such products are sold at the same price to all buyers. Retail prices vary
substantially as a result of bargaining by health maintenance
organizations, insurance companies, large employers, drug store chains
and others whose patronage is important to the pharmaceutical
companies. Discount pharmacies and internet pharmacies help to pass on
these lower prices to their customers. Retail prices are also subsidized by
insurance companies to their insureds. Yet these sometimes wide
variations in the prices of pharmaceutical products take place within a
single geographic market.

45

See General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1938)
(recognizing that license limitations can prevent licensee from conveying title to a third
party).
46U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8, cl. 3.
47See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, the commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act:
Why We Should Follow a Consistent Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L. J. 1227 (1995); Daniel A.
Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s Eye View of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994).
48 C & A Carbone, Inc v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 423 (1994).
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The U.S. experience suggests a way of reacting to the EU caselaw
that takes account of political differences within the Union and yet would
help to foster a common market in pharmaceuticals. Critics like Korah
assert that the Court’s decisions undermine the incentives of the
pharmaceutical companies to develop new drugs. She makes these
assertions because she focuses upon the arbitrage effects: Shipments from
low price countries into high-price countries undermine the patentee’s
high prices in the latter. But the United States provides a counter example.
Noone contends that the U.S. market is segmented geographically. Yet
prices in the U.S. vary widely as already noted. Moreover, prices in the
U.S. are affected in both directions by the large purchases that the U.S.
government makes through its Medicaid and other programs. Because the
government purchases drugs for use by those who would otherwise be
unable to afford them, it has raised the demand for drugs, generating an
upward pressure on their prices. Conversely, because the government is a
large buyer, it can and does exert downward pressure on prices through
its approval of purchase prices under those same programs. It would be
possible for the nations of the European Union to follow approximately
the same policies that they are now following, if the nations that now
impose price controls were to substitute government purchases at
negotiated prices. There is no reason to believe that the pharmaceutical
companies that choose to market their products in nations imposing price
controls would not be willing to sell them to government agencies in those
nations at negotiated prices that were identical to the present regulated
prices. In such cases, the companies would probably tailor the quantities
sold to the needs of the particular nation, thus minimizing the prospect of
arbitrage, in the manner that Bayer and others are doing now.49 But sales
to a government agency for domestic needs would probably more closely
approximate national needs than the present system that depends upon
the manufacturer’s estimates and sets of distributors that are actively
trying to misinform the manufacturer in the interest of securing larger
supplies for export to higher-priced states.
This approach would be consistent with the incentive structure of
patent law. The incentive structure of patent law is premised upon the
market. There is no assumption that bargaining cannot take place in the
49

See supra note 40.
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market. Indeed, the exclusive rights accorded to the patentees assumes
that the patentees will bargain hard in their dealings with licensees and
customers. Conversely, the market premise of patent law is also consistent
with hard bargaining by customers, especially large customers. The
attraction of this possible middle approach is that it is fully consistent with
the incentive structure of patent law, that it is supportive of a common
market in pharmaceuticals, and that it respects policy differences among
the member states.
Under the middle-ground approach advocated here, each nation of
the EU that wished to intervene in the market for pharmaceutical products
would do so through negotiation and bargaining with the pharmaceutical
companies over prices, terms of sale, dates of delivery, and quantities
purchased. Other purchasers (i.e., nongovernmental purchasers) would
also be free to negotiate with the pharmaceutical companies as well. As
explained, this scenario would likely produce results no less favorable to
consumers than those now obtaining in the various member states of the
EU. Yet this scenario would also be more compatible with a common
market
IV. IMPEDIMENTS TO THE FUNCTIONING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWS: THE DOUBLE EDGE OF JUDICIAL TREATMENTS OF
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
Biotechnology innovation has been protected in the United States
by the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (providing protection for asexually
reproduced plants)50 and the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act (extending
protection to sexually plants).51 The Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty52 upheld the patentability under the general patent
law of genetically-engineered organisms, thus fostering the development
of the biotechnology industry. In the wake of Chakrabarty, the critical
issues affecting biotechnology patents have been resolved in the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

5035

U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (2000).
U.S.C. §§ 2321 (2000).
52447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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European and American laws governing patents in general and
biotechnology inventions in particular employ similar concepts. Both sets
of laws require novelty and a substantial advance before providing
protection to an invention,53 and both employ the concept of a skilled
professional in the relevant field as a baseline for measuring the
substantiality of that advance.54 Nonetheless, the two systems appear to
operate quite differently and to embrace significantly different policies.
The U.S. law has entwined the protection of biotechnology
advances in a doctrinal mix involving description, enablement,
obviousness and equivalence. Thus, like the European law, the U.S. Patent
law extends protection only to inventions that are “non-obvious,”55
inventions which are beyond the ability of a skilled professional working
in the field. Like the European law, it also requires that a patent
application contain a written description of the invention56 in terms that
are sufficiently clear and precise as to enable a skilled person to make and
use it. In the United States, these traditional requirements of patentability
have taken on some new characteristics as they apply to biotechnology.
Much of the work in biotechnology involves the dna structure and
its relation to the creation of proteins. Dna is essentially the blueprint used
by living organisms to create the proteins needed in the process of life.
The Federal Circuit has taken a two-pronged approach to the patentability
of dna molecular structure. First, the court has taken the position that a
53

35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty); id., § 103 (nonobviousness); European Patent Convention
(“EPC”), Art. 54 (novelty); id., Art 52(1) (inventive step).
54 35 U.S.C. § 103; EPC, Art. 56.
5535 U.S.C. §103(a) (2000). See EPC, Arts. 52(1), 56.
56Section 111 requires the patent application to contain a specification as prescribed by
section 112. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000). Section 112 requires that the specification contain a
“written description” of the invention “and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same . . . .” 35 U.S.C. §112 (2000). The latter is commonly referred to as the enablement
requirement. The European analogue to § 112 is EPO Art. 83, which requires the
application to “disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to
be carried out by a person skilled in the art.”. Its description requirement is contained in
EPO, art. 80(d). As in § 112, the EPO requires that the claims be supported by the
description. EPO, art. 84.
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dna structure which cannot be described cannot be obvious.57 This
approach, in combination with the redundancy of the genetic code, has
meant that dna structures have been treated as nonobvious and therefore
patentable, even though the corresponding amino acid structure of the
related protein was generally known.58 Knowledge of the protein
structure does not reveal the actual dna structure, because a potentially
wide variety of dna structures might theoretically produce the given
protein structure. This part of the Federal Circuit’s approach, which has
facilitated the patenting of dna molecular structure,59 has provided
support to the biotechnology industry, encouraging work on the
identification and isolation of a multitude of dna structures.
The second prong of the court’s approach, however, may produce
an opposite effect. In a mirror image of its approach to the obviousness of
a dna structure, the court has read section 112’s description provision as
requiring, as a condition of patentability, that each link in the claimed dna
segment be identified. Thus, for example, in the Eli Lilly case,60 the
University of California had claimed patents on the dna structure for
human insulin, vertebrate insulin and mammalian insulin. The
57In

re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“What cannot be contemplated or
conceived cannot be obvious.”); In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 785 (Fed.Cir.1993). In
incorporating the description requirement into the nonobviousness standard, the Federal
Circuit has, in effect, lowered the standard of nonobviousness and thereby facilitated
patent grants. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 1, 55 (1992) (advocating a modest reduction in the nonobviousness standard in
areas of high-cost research to encourage such research)..
58 In re Deuel, supra note 57 ; In re Bell, supra note 57.
59 Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that while lowering the standard of
nonobviousness is good policy towards fields afflicted by uncertainty and high research
costs, the uncertainty and costs afflicting the biotechnology industry is not generally at
the stage of the initial research that produces the invention but at the post-patent stage in
bringing the product through the hurdle of FDA regulation too market. They therefore
urge that the Federal Circuit adopt a very different approach to biotechnology inventions
than the one that they have been following. They urge a reduced description requirement
and high standards of nonobviousness. This approach would produce a fewer but more
valuable patents. The higher-value patents would facilitate the inventment needed to
navigate through the post-patent development stage. And the lower number of patents
would avoid anticommons problems that might be generated by a multiplicity of dna
patents. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1680-83 (2003).
60Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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University’s claim for human insulin failed because the specification
lacked a written description of its subject matter. The University had
described only the cDNA of rat insulin in its specification, along with a
method for obtaining human cDNA plus the amino acid sequences of
human insulin A and B chains.61 The court ruled that whether or not this
disclosure was enabling, it was deficient because it did not “provide a
written description of the cDNA encoding human insulin”62 and thus
failed to satisfy the description requirement in section 112.
The
University’s claims for vertebrate and mammalian insulin also failed the
written description requirement because the specification contained a
description only of the cDNA of a species (rat insulin) and not of either of
the claimed genera.63
These failures to describe the dna structures rendered the
University’s claims invalid, even though the court conceded that its patent
application may have supplied information sufficient to enable a skilled
professional to obtain human insulin.64 The Federal Circuit’s emphasis
upon a full description of the molecular structure is an outgrowth of its
approach to chemical patents, especially those involving inorganic
compounds or simpler organic compounds. In dealing with ordinary
chemical compounds, the court rightly has insisted upon a complete
description of molecular structure and has been more willing to infer
obviousness when the claimed compound is structurally similar to one or
more previously known compounds.65 Its refusal to draw the same
inferences of obviousness in the case of dna is based in the greater
complexity of dna structure and its redundancy. Yet while the court
recognizes the differences between dna and non-dna structures for
purposes of obviousness, it imposes the same description requirements for
both dna and non-dna compounds.

61119

F.3d at 1567.

62Id.
63119

F.3d at 1567-68.
F.3d at 1567 (“Whether or not [the specification] provides an enabling disclosure, it
does not provide a written description of the cDNA encoding human insulin . . . .”)
65In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
64119
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The court’s critics believe that this approach to the description
requirement places biotechnology companies in a difficult position that
may inhibit their research activities. If a company rushes its discovery to
the patent office, it may be able to obtain a patent only upon one variety of
a dna structure for a beneficial protein, while enabling its competitors to
use its research—now publicly revealed in its patent—to produce
unprotected equivalents. Yet delay may mean that a rival will either
identify the dna sequence on another variety or even the dna sequences
common to the genus. Either way, the risk that research results will be
economically unprotectable is increased. Concomitantly, the incentives to
research are undermined.
The problem of the Lilly case results from the greater stringency
placed upon the description requirement relative to the enablement
requirement. Yet the ability to describe is not unrelated to enablement. At
least in the case of the claim involving human insulin, the claim failure
appears to have been the fault of the University. (If its disclosure enabled
the production of the cDNA for human insulin, then, with some
additional work, it could have supplied the required description.) But will
the ruling in that case generate other decisions that discourage research as
the critics fear? That is, will the decision delay patent filing? Will it foster
an environment in which rivals free-ride off of an innovator’s research by
producing slightly different but similarly-functioning dna molecules? In
U.S. patent law, the judicially-developed doctrine of equivalents has been
the primary mechanism designed to protect patentees against free-riding
on another’s invention in situations in which the other does not literally
infringe. But the scope of that doctrine is in doubt and its future is
cloudy.66 Traditionally, an invention is the equivalent of another if is
structurally the same and one or more elements, although literally
different from the patented invention, are interchangeable with the
elements recited in the claim, and the interchangeability would be known
by a skilled professional.67 Recent cases, however, have introduced
complications into that doctrine. The courts have been concerned that a
patentee might intentionally narrow its claims while it is seeking Patent
Office approval and then later, in the context of an infringement suit, seek
66See

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002);
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
67 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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to recover what it had surrendered through a judicial application of the
doctrine of equivalents.68 In order to prevent this kind of strategic
behavior, the courts have created the doctrine of prosecution estoppel,
which bars such a patentee from so using the equivalence doctrine to
recover the protection that it had earlier surrendered in negotiations with
the Patent Office.
The doctrine of equivalents was recently applied at the protein
level to an Amgen composition of erythropoietin glycoprotein.69 In that
case Amgen had mistakenly claimed a protein with a 166 amino-acid
sequence.70 The protein initially possessed a 166 sequence, but at the time
that it became ready to perform its work in the body, it had shed one
sequence. The alleged infringer had produced a protein with the 165
amino-acid sequence that performed similarly to Amgen’s. Because the
rival’s product lacked one of the amino acids identified in Amgen’s claim,
it did not literally infringe. Nonetheless, the district court upheld Amgen’s
infringement claim under the doctrine of equivalents.71
Yet that doctrine of equivalents ultimately proved unavailable to
Amgen. During the patent prosecution, Amgen had amended its
application to distinguish its claims from another patent that had already
been issued to it. Because this amendment had not made for any reason
related to the statutory patent requirements, the district court found the
amendment innocuous.72 On appeal, however, the Federal Circuit ruled
that this amendment—because it was made for a patent related reason—
estopped Amgen from using the doctrine of equivalents.73 The appellate
decision in Amgen thus suggests that the doctrine of equivalents may have
a more limited potential applicability than it has previously been
68

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002);
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30-31 (1997).
69Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 69, 99-100 (D. Mass. 2001),
aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
70 See 314 F.3d at 1343 (“At the time the patent was drafted, it was believed that the
sequence included 166 amino acids . . . . In fact, the full sequence wwas actually 165
amino acids; the last (arginine) is actually cleaved off prior to the protein’s secretion from
the cell.”)
71Id., at 133-34.
72 126 F.Supp.2d at 134.
73 314 F.3d at 1345.
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understood to possess. Because of the complex structures characteristic of
dna and proteins, the current incarnations of the doctrines of obviousness,
and the recently enhanced description requirement appear to leave dna
and protein claims vulnerable to free-riding, in the absence of strong
protection under the doctrine of equivalents. The erosion of the latter
doctrine, therefore, appears to strike at the heart of biotech patent
protection.
The European approach to biotechnology patents appears so far to
have avoided the doctrinal morass of the American decisions. In several
decisions the Technical Board of Appeal has upheld biotech patents that
made broad claims that were cast in functional language,74 indicating that
the European system my be more encouraging of biotechnical research
than the U.S. system.75 Some decisions of the European Technical Board of
Appeal do seem to be sensitive to the dilemma generated by the Ely Lilly
decision. In Biogen/Recombinant Dna, for example, the Board justified the
use of functional language on the ground that “[u]nless claims with such
functional connotations are allowable, no worthwhile protection is
provided against a third-party which faithfully repeats the process of the
patent and obtains new but equally useful variants of the invention.”76 Yet
while tolerant of functional language, the European system is careful to
limit protection—like the U.S. law—to the scope of that which can be
enabled. The difference then is that the U.S. system adds an enhanced
description requirement. If this enhanced description requirement does
inhibit research as the critics fear, then the U.S. courts will have made a
wrong turn in the Lillycase.
74

See Genentech I/Polypeptide Expression, T292/85 (1988) (“It follows that the features
may generically embrace the use of unknown or not yet envisaged possibilities, including
specific variants which might be provided or invented in the future.”);
Biogen/Recombinant Dna, T301/87 (1989) (“Unless claims with such functional
connotations are allowable, no worthwhile protection is provided against a third-party
which faithfully repeats the process of the patent and obtains new but equally useful
variants of the invention.”) The reader will observe that this approach is consistent with
the policy recommendations of Burk and Lemley for biotechnology patent policy. See
Burk & Lemley, supra note 59.
75 See, e.g. LI WESTERLUND, BIOTECH PATENTS: EQUIVALENCY AND EXCLUSIONS UNDER
EUROPEAN AND US PATENT LAW 121-23 (2002) (discussing Eli Lilly and comparing the
strictness of European and U.S. approaches to biotechnology patents).
76 T301/87 (1980).
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A stylized version of this problem can be represented as follows:
The number of vertebrates is n, and thus the number of vertebrate insulin
dna structures is also n. A patent covering the genus of vertebrate dna
structures would extend to all n structures. Because a patent of generic
scope could not be easily avoided, its value would be the present value of
the income stream generated by the use of dna for the production of
insulin of all types. Assuming that stream is $m per year, that value could
be represented as follows:
20

3 $m/(1+r)i.
i=3

But a patent relating to the dna of only one species would have a scope of
only 1/n of the genus patent. Since, in theory, (n-1)/n of the scope of the
genus patent would be open to rivals to produce freely, the initial species
patent would represent exclusive rights over only an insignificant share of
the commercially valuable genus. Indeed it is possible that, following the
doctrine that what cannot be described cannot be obvious, the rivals might
each patent their own dna variants. In any case, the market in insulin
would be transformed into a fully competitive market and the initial
patentee and its rivals will compete away their rents. The incentives for
research provided by the patent system would thus be proved illusory.
Because dna patents are a relatively new phenomenon, it is to be
expected that new issues will emerge in the application of preexisting
doctrine. To a large extent, as the preceding discussion has shown, these
are issues of patent scope arising under the rubrics of obviousness,
enablement, description, and equivalents. They involve the courts in
working out the interrelationships among these doctrines in ways that fit
the complexities of the dna contexts. They are not easy tasks. Yet the
welfare goals underlying the patent system can sometimes provide
needed guidance. As the courts come to better understandings of the
technology, they will be better able to formulate these various doctrines in
ways that support (rather than undermine) the incentive structure of the
patent system.
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V. THE SCOPE OF COMPUTER PROGRAM PROTECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF
THE ANTI-COMMONS.
Although computer programs currently receive protection in the
U.S. under both patent and copyright laws, that has not always been the
case. The protection of computer programs in the United States did not
begin until the 1980s. During the previous decade, patent protection
appeared to be unavailable, as the Supreme Court caselaw appeared to to
be saying that patentable subject matter did not include “mathematical
algorithms,”77 suggesting to many observers that computer programs
could not be protected under patent law. Moreover, the 1976 revision of
the U.S. copyright law contained no provision protecting computer
programming. Only in 1980 did Congress amend the copyright law to
provide protection for computer programs. And only in 1981 did the
Supreme Court relax its hostility towards the protection of computer
programs under patent law.
The Court’s more tolerant attitude towards computer programs
was expressed, in 1981, in its Diamond v. Diehr decision78 that upheld the
patentability of a process for curing rubber inside a mold, even though a
component of the process involved a computer (using a well-known
mathematical formula) to continuously update the curing time as a result
of temperature inputs from within the mold. In that case, the Court
characterized the patent as pertaining to an industrial process and thus to
subject matter that has been traditionally protected by patent law. Because
the computer program in Diehr was only a part of a larger process, the
Court was able to uphold the patentability of the process without
repudiating its earlier assertions that algorithms themselves were
unprotectable. The Diehr decision then made possible the Federal Circuit’s
aggressive protection of computer programs throughout the 1990s.
In 1994, the Federal Circuit upheld the patentability of a patent for
transforming discrete electronic inputs into a smooth waveform display in
a digital oscilloscope, despite the fact that the invention consisted almost

77

Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586, 594 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72
(1972).
78450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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(if not quite entirely) of a computer algorithm.79 The court, however,
reasoned that computer programming can transform general purpose
computers into specialized machines to perform particular functions. In
this case, the programming transformed discrete data into a smooth curve
on a standard monitoring device. Extending the scope of patentable
programming even further, the court in its 1998 State Street Bank decision80
upheld the patentability of a computer program for implementing a
financial structure for mutual funds.
Most computer programs, when protectable under patent law,
receive their protection at a higher level of abstraction than simple
machine or source code81. Patent applications involving computer
programs are generally stated in means-plus-function language, in an
effort to obtain protection that includes the implementation of a functional
element of the invention by any computer program, a strategy that will
succeed so long as the patent office and the courts view inventions
incorporating other programs implementing that function as equivalents.
Both because the patent office and the courts currently view most
programming as the implementation of a simple skill common to all or
most programmers, and because patentees rarely describe their programs
at the level of source code in the patent specifications, this strategy is
likely to be successful. In this context, the difficulties that the Court had
experienced in the past over the protection of algorithms are minimized,
because it is not the particular algorithm that generally constitutes the
patented invention. Rather the invention consists in the performance of
the function by that or any equivalent algorithm.
Protection for computer programming at the level of code and code
structure is the generally function of copyright law. Computer programs
are treated as “literary works” under U.S. copyright law, an approach
that, given the essentially utilitarian nature of programming, is somewhat
at odds with the tradition of copyright as the protector of the literary and
artistic. Yet copyright protection has the advantage of protecting
79In

re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (fed. cir. 1994).
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
81 See discussion of standards for software patents in Burk & Lemley , supra note 59 at
1688.
80State
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narrowly. Copyright protection does not extend to ideas, reserving
protection for major innovations to the patent law. Moreover, because it
protects only against copying, the copyright regime guarantees freedom
for independent creation. A major social disadvantage to copyright
protection of computer programs, however, is the extensive period of
protection, a period that at least in the case of programming is far too
long.
The lack of copyright protection for computer programs in the
1970s was particularly unfortunate because the personal computer
industry was in its gestation and early stages of growth during this
period. And software firms were vulnerable to free-riding.82 Another
consequence of the absence of copyright protection for software was the
exposure of operating systems to fragmentation, a potential that was
realized in the case of the unix operating system, developed by American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. in its Bell Laboratories in the 1970s. Unix was
extensively employed by many firms and individuals, many of whom
introduced their own modifications to the program, with the result that
various versions of unix emerged. This created a circumstance in which
one version would not necessarily interact with other versions, at least
without problems.83 Because operating systems become more useful and
hence valuable as their common user base increases, unix–despite its great
value–has fallen short of its potential.
Here, accordingly, was another market failure and one that was the
direct result of the absence of an effective intellectual-property regime. In
the so-called new economy, certain kinds of software--especially operating
systems--possess characteristics that facilitate user interaction with each
other and with commonly-used software application programs. As a
result, widespread use of the same operating system creates a virtual
network that increase the software’s value as its user base increases.
82See

Bill Gates’ “An Open Letter to Hobbyists,” reprinted in STEPHEN MANES & PAUL
ANDREWS, GATES: HOW MICROSOFT’S MOGUL REINVENTED AN INDUSTRY AND MADE
HIMSELF THE RICHEST MAN IN AMERICA 91-92 (1993). The incident giving rise to Gates’
letter is described in John Markoff, A Tale of the Tape From the Days When it Was Still Micro
Soft, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2000 at C1.
83Howard A. Shelanski & J.Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 87 (2001).
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Fragmentation of the operating system erodes or shrinks or destroys that
virtual network, erasing the value that it would otherwise have possessed.
It is one of the functions of intellectual property rights to protect networkgenerating software against the kinds of modifications that threaten the
network. Unix’s potential as network-generating software was eroded
because Bell Laboratories was unable to assert control over the
modifications. The 1980 legislation that provided copyright protection to
software created the property rights that are essential to guarding against
fragmentation. Today the Microsoft Corporation asserts control over its
Windows operating system through copyright and other intellectual
property rights, preventing users from modifying it in ways that
undermine its usefulness as an operating system. Similarly, Sun
Microsystems, Inc. uses copyright and trademark certification to protect
its Java platform from fragmenting.84 Copyright is even being employed
to rehabilitate unix as AT&T and Sun attempt to reassert control over that
software.85
Even after Congress provided copyright protection to software, the
scope of that protection remained uncertain. It took a number of years for
the courts to work out standards of protection that met the industry’s
needs. Initially, the scope of protection that copyrighted programs
received from the courts was too broad. In 1987, the Third Circuit in
Whelan86 took the position that the purpose or function of the program
was its unprotectable idea, and that everything else constituted
protectable expression. Five years later, however, the Second Circuit in
84Sun’s concern over fragmentation underlay its litigation with Microsoft, its complaints
about the latter to the Justice Department. Sun saw Microsoft’s creation of a Window’s
specific version of Java and Microsoft’s handling of Java’s native calls as generating
fragmentation that ultimately would destroy Java as an alternative platform. Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 115, 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1999), vacating
and remanding 21 F.Supp.2d 1109, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 1998). See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 992, 996-97, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (on remand). The Justice
Department also shared these concerns. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84
F.Supp.2d 9, 105-110 (D.C.C. 1999) (findings 386-407).
85
Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, 152 F.3d 48, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1998). See
discussion in Robert Axelrod, Will Mitchell, Robert E. Thomas, D. Scott Bennett & Erhard
Bruderer, Setting Standards: Coalition Formation in Standard-Setting Alliances in THE
COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION 96, 107 (Robert Axelrod, ed. 1997).
86Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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Altai87 modified Whelan’s approach by identifying as an unprotectable
“idea” the purpose of each routine and subroutine of the larger program.
Then the elements of the routine or subroutine that implemented their
purposes would be protectable, so long as they were not required for
efficient operation, were not standard routines in common use and were
not required for external reasons, such as the requirements of the
hardware. The court described this kind of analysis as an abstractionfiltration-comparison test. First it followed an abstraction approach by
identifying the several levels (routines, subroutines, etc.) where it would
perform the rest of its analysis. At each level it identified the
unprotectable idea and the elements that were unprotectable for reasons
of efficiency, standard usage, external constraints or public domain, and
filtered them out. Then it compared what was left, i.e. the protectable
elements, with the corresponding elements of the accused program, to
determine the extent (if any) of infringement.
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test narrows copyright
protection significantly. As a consequence, the potential for copyrights in
existing programs to interfere with efforts of programmers in constructing
new programs is minimized. Built into the Altai test is permission to use
whatever is necessary for efficiency reasons and to employ all of the
standardized modules familiar to programmers. And, of course,
programmers can legitimately employ whatever is necessary for the
hardware or for interoperability. Altai, while remaining faithful to the
law’s prohibition against copying, has also ensured that copyright law
will not be employed to create barriers to creativity. Indeed, the problem
symbolized by the anti-commons—impediments to innovation raised by
an abundance of preexisting intellectual property rights—appears to have
been minimized by that decision and its progeny.
The potential for copyright to reduce social value (rather than to
encourage the creation of new social value) has been further lowered as a
result of both caselaw and legislation that allow reverse engineering of
computer programs for the purpose of achieving interoperability. Several

87Computer

Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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decisions now recognize that right.88And in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act89 Congress included a provision excluding reverse
engineering for achieving interoperability from its otherwise general
prohibitions against circumvention of copyright protection systems.
The First Circuit’s Lotus decision further confirms that copyright
may not be employed to reduce social value. In that case, a rival had
copied the command structure of the Lotus spreadsheet program so as to
reduce the learning costs that would be imposed upon users of Lotus who
wished to switch to the rival’s spreadsheet program. No social purpose
would be advanced by protecting the command structure. Indeed
protecting the command structure would have conflicted with the law’s
manifest purpose of encouraging programming; the law has no purpose of
encouraging the imposition of learning costs upon consumers. Lotus
highlights the coincidence of copyright protection with the furtherance of
social welfare.
In short, the phenomenon of the anti-commons identified in the
literature is a theoretical construct in which intellectual property rights
work perversely by creating barriers to innovation. At least in the
copyright protection of computer programs, this possibility seems to be
minimized by the caselaw that limits the extent to which programs are
protectable. The abstraction-filtration-comparison test of infringement
appears to bar the protection of programming elements that are required
by other programmers; a line of cases explicitly allows copying necessary
to achieving program interoperability; and the Lotus decision—by denying
protection where aggregate social value would be reduced by
protection—provides confirmation that the courts will resolve most

88Sony

Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectrix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v.
Nintendo, 964 F.2d 965 (9th cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 985 (1993) also supports the
broad proposition that the courts have not favored the use of copyright to exclude
products produced by others from interacting with protected software.
89Pub.L. 105_304, Title I, § 103(a). In its provisions prohibiting the circumvention of
copyright protection systems, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act included an
exception for reverse engineering for the purpose of achieving interoperability. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(f) (2000).
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disputed issues in copyright coverage in a way that furthers (rather than
reduces) social welfare.90
Patent protection, however, raises more difficult problems. In an
invention in which the computer program performs a function that is only
one out of several functional elements (as in the rubber-curing invention
involved in Diamond v. Diehr) the computer program remains available for
use by others in different contexts. But where the primary operational
element of the invention is the program and that program has only one
highly specialized use, as in State Street Bank, (where the program
determined and allocated investment-fund values) not only that program
but all other programs performing the same function may well be offlimits to other inventors. Note too that the patentee does not ordinarily
describe the program in its specification at the level of source code.91
Rather the program is usually described in terms of its structure which
itself often takes the form of describing relationships between various
functions. Thus the higher the level of structural description contained in
the specification, the broader is the range of actual programs that will fall
within the scope of equivalents to it
As yet unexplored areas of patent law, however, may limit what
potentially would otherwise be too broad an area of protection. It is only
the equivalents of the program that are treated as an element of the
protected invention. And the traditional test for equivalence is satisfied
when an alternative performs substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result. If an alternative
program is structurally sufficiently different as to negate equivalency
under the triple-identity test, then a rival device employing the alternative
program will not infringe. In context, this would be the case when the
alternative program produced the same result but in a structurally
different “way”. Thus although patent protection of computer programs

90

In their discussion of patent law, Burk and Lemley expressed the concern that because
software develops through incremental improvements, small improvements should be
protected. Burk & Lemley, supra note 59 at 1689. That function may be presently
performed by copyright law.
91 See text at note 81 supra.

LAW REVIEW

38

[Vol. xx

possesses a potential for overprotection,92 there is a little room for
maneuver. The extent to which this theoretical room for maneuver can in
fact be realized awaits further development of the caselaw.

VI. RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
MISUSE AND ANTITRUST LAWS: WELFARE EFFECTS

UNDER

Both the patent and copyright misuse doctrines are judicial
creations designed to prevent intellectual property rights from being used
contrary to the purposes of those laws. The misuse doctrine entered patent
law in the first quarter of the twentieth century as a judicial attempt to
incorporate antitrust concerns into patent law itself. It was in this context
that the courts developed the language that condemned an attempt to
“extend” a patent beyond the terms of its grant. The courts generally
conceptualized misuse as the leveraging of the “monopoly” conferred by a
patent into a second market: the patentee used its power over the patented
product to compel a purchaser or licensee to purchase (or license) a
second product. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the courts
adopted a copyright misuse doctrine modeled upon the earlier patent
misuse doctrine.
A. Patent Misuse
The patent misuse doctrine reached its apogee in the Mercoid cases
of the 1940s.93 In those cases the Court condemned practices employed in
marketing thermostats by the Honeywell Corporation. Honeywell sold
thermostats in packages that carried a license authorizing purchasers to
construct certain patented heating systems. (The patented heating systems
involved a furnace, thermostat, and furnace override.) The Court
characterized this marketing as involving the patented heating system as
92

Overprotection of software is one of the concerns raised by Burk & Lemley. See Burk &
Lemley, supra note 59 at 1688-89.
93 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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the tying product and the thermostat as the tied product. It then
condemned the arrangement in sweeping terms. Indeed, the Court’s
rhetoric was so broad that it undermined the doctrine of contributory
infringement, a patent doctrine dating back into the nineteenth century. In
response, the Congress enacted legislation restoring the doctrine of
contributory infringement and imposing stringent limits on the
development and application of the misuse doctrine by the courts.94
These legislative constraints on the misuse doctrine have enabled
patentees better to exploit their patents. Very often, arrangements that the
courts have conceptualized as problematic tying arrangements have in
fact been dictated by the practicalities of marketing and have been
efficiency-enhancing. In the Mercoid cases, for example, the Court
condemned as misuse (and unlawful tying) the sale of unpatented
thermostats together with licenses to use the thermostats in the
construction of patented heating systems. In so doing, the Court
effectively ignored the fact that Honeywell’s expertise inhered in
manufacturing thermostats. Society’s welfare would not be enhanced by
requiring Honeywell to market heating systems. Indeed, the customers
were likely to be able to install the heating system more efficiently than
Honeywell, or to be able to contract with an efficient installer. In Rohm &
Hass,95 the company possessed a patent over the use of propanil as a
herbicide. The patentee was best able to market its process by selling
propanil to farmers, together with a license to use it as a herbicide. Indeed,
this method of marketing minimizes distribution costs. No social purpose
would be furthered by requiring the company to sell process licenses to
farmers.
In short, the dimensions of the misuse doctrine changed over time
in accordance with changes in institutional understandings of social
welfare. First the courts created the misuse doctrine to condemn tying
arrangements that they viewed as reducing social welfare. Later Congress
later modified that doctrine when it concluded that at lest some tying
arrangements were legitimate means for the exploitation of patents.
94

See 66 Stat. 811, ch. 950 (1952). That legislation and its subsequent amendment have
given us the present section 271 of the patent act. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
95 Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980).
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B. Copyright Misuse.
In its 1990 Lasercomb decision,96 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit resurrected the doctrine of copyright misuse, which had
been largely neglected up to that time. Asserting the copyright law was
sufficiently similar to the patent law to justify incorporating a copyright
analogue to patent misuse, the court justified its new doctrine, to a large
extent, on the basis of the judicial decisions that had created the patent
misuse doctrine. Yet the court did not feel constrained by the legislative
limits that Congress had placed on patent misuse. Moreover, the court
construed its new doctrine expansively. Under the court’s approach a
copyright is misused (and therefore unenforceable) whenever it is licensed
with a restriction that the court deems to impose a restraint. Thus in the
Lasercomb case itself, the owner of a copyright on cad/cam software
(computer aided design-computer aided manufacturing) licensed it to a
manufacturing company, providing in the licensing agreement that
during the term of the agreement the licensee would be prohibited from
designing cad/cam software. The licensor justified the restriction on the
ground that it helped to protect itself against licensees who sought to
divert its work product to their own use. The Fourth Circuit, however,
rejected that justification, asserting that no rule-of-reason defense should
be recognized in the application of the misuse doctrine. In a later case, the
Ninth Circuit followed that approach in finding misuse where the
copyright owner had entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with a
licensee.97
C. Intellectual Property, the Misuse Doctrines and Social Welfare
When the courts initially created the misuse doctrine, they were
attempting to ensure that the exclusive rights conferred by the intellectual
property laws would not be “extended” beyond the scope that Congress
intended. That is another way of saying that—given the assumptions of
96
97

Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
Practice Management Information Co. v. American Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (1997)
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intellectual-property law98—the courts were attempting to prevent the
intellectual property laws from being used perversely to reduce, rather
than to advance, aggregate social welfare. Consistent with this approach,
the courts took an aggressively expansive approach to patent misuse
during a period in which tying arrangements (which were the primary
subject of the misuse doctrine) were deemed to lack social value. During
the last half century, economists have come to recognize social value in
tying arrangements and coincidently Congress has cut back the courts’
powers to condemn tying arrangements in the patent context.
The creation of a copyright misuse doctrine by the courts in the
1990s can also be viewed as an effort by the courts to ensure that
copyright not be employed to reduce social welfare. Yet, except for a
qualification that I will introduce below, that effort was probably largely a
mistaken one. The most significant application of the copyright misuse
doctrine has been with software. And in this area, the potential of
copyright to reduce social value inheres in whatever capacity it possesses
for creating an anti-commons or otherwise to impede the creation of new
programming works. But we have seen that the courts have construed the
application of copyright law to software as to minimize that potential.
Their development of the abstraction-filtration-comparison test of
infringement; their aggressive use of the fair use doctrine to foster
program interoperability; and their overall openness to resolving
copyright issues so as to further aggregate social value work in this
direction. As a result of this enlightened approach to copyright
interpretation, the need for a copyright misuse doctrine has been
significantly reduced.
D. Innovation and Tying in American and European Competition Law

98

The relevant assumptions of intellectual property law are that the grant of an exclusive right for
the statutory period generates the incentive to create new products that adds to aggregate welfare
more than the cumulative deadweight loss detracts. In deciding upon the lengths of the patent and
copyright terms, the Congress is making the judgment that the social balance is positive. Judicial
judgments about “extensions” as constituting misuse can be understood as judicial judgments
about aggregate social welfare, given the legislative judgments about term length and other aspects
of the tradeoff.
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1. Under U.S. Antitrust Law--In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Justice
Department and the EU Commission questioned the licensing and other
practices of the Microsoft Corporation. These enforcement agencies were
particularly concerned about Microsoft’s custom of licensing its operating
systems to computer manufacturers at a lump sum amount keyed to the
estimated production capacity of the licensee. This practice was often
referred to as a “per-processor” license, since the fee was calculated solely
by the number of processors employed by the licensee.99 Because a
computer manufacturer thus paid for a Microsoft operating system license
for each computer that it produced, regardless of whether a Microsoft
operating system was actually installed on that computer, manufacturers
were discouraged from installing rival operating systems. Any
manufacturer that did so would have to pay twice for an operating system
license: once to Microsoft under the per-processor arrangement and once
to the rival os producer.
After the Justice Department challenged these practices in an
antitrust action, a three-way settlement was reached between the
Department and the European Commission on one side and Microsoft on
the other. Under the settlement Microsoft agreed to discontinue the perprocessor licensing practice. It was permitted to issue bulk licenses for
identifiable lines of computers, so long as these lines did not encompass
all of the licensee’s production. The settlement also gave rise to later
antitrust litigation between the Department and the Justice Department.
The settlement prohibited Microsoft from “tying” one product to
another, but permitted Microsoft to integrate two products together. As
the D.C. Circuit later explained,100 this provision was written against a
background that involved complaints by Digital Equipment to the EU
Commission about Microsoft “tying” its Windows 3.1 graphical user
interface to its MS-DOS operating system. In the negotiations over the
settlement terms, Microsoft–which had integrated the graphical user
interface into its operating system in Windows 95–insisted that product
integration be permitted. And the enforcement agencies agreed.
See Daniel J. Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice Department, and Antitrust Theory,
25 SW. U. L. REV. 621, 632 (1996).
100 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
99
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Subsequently the Justice Department, contending that Microsoft
had violated the consent degree by tying its Internet Explorer browser to
its Windows operating system, instituted a proceeding to hold that
company in contempt. Ultimately the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled in favor of Microsoft on the ground that
the browser appeared to be tied so closely to the operating system that
they were integrated (and thus protected) within the meaning of the
consent decree.101
The Department’s loss of the contempt proceeding did not end the
Department’s challenge to Microsoft’s marketing of its browser. Shortly
after the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the contempt proceeding, the
Department brought a new antitrust action, charging that Microsoft’s
bundling of its browser with its operating system constituted both an
unlawful tying arrangement under section one of the Sherman Act as well
as monopolization and attempted monopolization under section two.
Although the court of appeals ultimately upheld a ruling that Microsoft
had indeed monopolized by combining its browser with its operating
system,102 it is the grounds on which that court so ruled that are
interesting. The court in effect ruled that Microsoft wrongfully denied its
customers (i.e., the computer manufacturers) the ability to remove the
browser when they so desired.103 If the products were so designed as to
make that removal impossible, then Microsoft bore the burden of showing
an efficiency reason for barring the disintegration of the two products.
104Thus, for example, commingling the code for the operating system and
the browser in the same files effectively prevented the removal of the
browser; because Microsoft was unable to justify this commingling as
contributing in any way to the product’s value, the court ruled that the
commingling constituted an act of monopolization.105

United States v. Microsoft Corp., supra note 100 at 952.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir. 2001).
103
253 F.3d at 66-67. Microsoft had excluded the browser from the “Add/Remove Programs,”
thereby making it difficult or impossible to remove it.
104
Id., at 67.
105
Id., at 67.
101
102
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To appreciate fully the court’s monopolization ruling, it is
necessary to observe that the monopolization theory underlying the
Department’s case was somewhat unique.106 Monopolization consists in
acquiring or maintaining a monopoly through unlawful means.107
Monopolization cases often involve a contention that a firm possessing
market power has attempted to leverage that power to create a monopoly
in that or another market.108 Microsoft, however, was charged with
monopolization through unlawful maintenance. Although the courts have
gradually worked out some standards by which to evaluate claims of
unlawful acquisition, they have not developed precise standards for
evaluating claims of unlawful maintenance. The D.C. Circuit dealt with
the lack of standards for evaluating monopoly maintenance claims in two
ways. First it relaxed the causal standards for connecting the defendant’s
behavior and the likely market impact.109 The high causal standards
generally imposed in acquisition cases were deemed inapplicable. Second,
it required Microsoft to come forward with a reason for combining its
browser with its operating system.110
When it dealt with the section-one tying issue, however, the issue
became an alleged restraint of competition in the browser market. Under
the then-existing law, tying arrangements by a firm with market power
would be condemned as per se illegal. Microsoft possessed market power,
so the issue would have been whether two products were tied together or
whether they were so integrated as to constitute only one product (so that
there was no tie). That issue, in turn, depended upon whether the plaintiff
could establish separate demands for the browser and the operating
system. The existence of separate demands, as the test for deciding
whether one or two products are involved, had been formulated by the
Supreme Court in 1984, in its Jefferson Parish decision.111
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The court of appeals, however, ruled that the separate demand test
was actually a proxy for efficiency.112 Normally where integration would
be more efficient, buyers would demand the combination. But platform
software advances have often taken the form of integrating previously
separate functionalities into the platform. Since there is almost always a
pre-existing software program providing a functionality before that
functionality is integrated into an operating system, the separate demand
test would essentially treat all expansions of operating systems as ties.113
The court thus concluded that the use of a separate demand test would be
likely to deter efficient advances in platform software where efficiency
dictated integration of new functionalities into the platform. For these
reasons, the court rejected the per se test as applied to the integration of
new functionalities into platform software. Rather, the court ruled that
this type of integration would be governed by the rule of reason. Under
the rule of reason, the plaintiff bear the burden of establishing that
integration of new functionalities into platform software was inefficient.
114

In short, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
adopted an efficiency test for evaluating ties involving platform software
under both section one and two. Where the charge was monopolization,
the court placed the burden of showing that the design was efficient upon
the defendant monopolist. Where the issue was tying under section one,
the burden of showing that the arrangement was inefficient was placed
upon the government-plaintiff. But the court made clear that under both
sections, the issue turned on the efficiency of the integration. Restated, the
issue turned upon whether or not combining the two products generated
greater value.
2. Under European Competition Law—The European Commission
currently appears to be taking an approach to the integration of platform software
that is the mirror image of the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit on the
section-one tying issue. Whereas the U.S. court presumed that integration of
functionalities into the operating system was lawful, the European Commission is
construing similar behavior as an abuse of dominant position. The issue before
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the European Commission involves the integration of the Windows Media Player
into the Windows operating system.115 That integration, of course, disadvantages
independent vendors of media software, but it appears to enhance the usefulness
of the operating system to the advantage of consumers, just as the integration of
other functionalities into the operating system in the past has advantaged
consumers. The Commission’s view, however, is that its decision will enable
computer manufacturers to install media players of other brands, whenever
consumer tastes so indicate. The Commission may be viewing the Windows
operating system as an essential facility to which rival software companies need
access.
The extent to which intellectual property (or an intellectual
property product) may be treated as an essential facility has been at the
cutting edge of European law development for the last decade. In the
early nineteen nineties, the European Court of Justice ruled, in the now
widely discussed Magill case,116 that a copyright holder’s refusal to
license a potential competitor in a derivative market could constitute an
abuse of dominant position. That case involved the refusal by several
television broadcasters to make their programming schedules available to
an independent publisher that wished to publish a combined
programming guide. In the early nineties, the television programming
available to the Irish public was provided by the Irish network, Radio
Telefis Eireann (RTE) (two channels), the British Broadcasting Corporation
(BBC) (two channels), Independent TeleVision (ITV), and Channel 4. (ITV
and Channel 4 were both provided by the Independent Broadcasting
Authority.) Each of these television networks published its own
programming guide, but there was no comprehensive guide to all
programming.
Magill saw an opportunity to fill an unfilled demand by publishing
a comprehensive programming guide. When it published its
comprehensive guide however, RTE, the BBC and Independent Television
Publications (the publication arm of IBA) brought suit against Magill for
copyright infringement. They sought and obtained from the Irish courts
an injunction against Magill’s use of their programming schedules.
115
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Magill, in turn, complained to the European Commission. The
Commission sided with Magill, charging that the television broadcasters
were abusing dominant positions in refusing to license their schedules to
Magill. As a result of the abuse, the broadcasters were ordered to supply
their television schedules to Magill at a reasonable royalty. The
Commission’s ruling was upheld by both the Court of First Instance and
the Court of Justice.
American observers are generally struck by several aspects of the
Magill ruling. First, the Court of Justice imposed a duty on the
broadcasters to license their copyrighted material to a rival that wanted to
supply a product that the copyright holders themselves did not offer.
Under U.S. law, a copyright holder normally may deny permission to
others to use the copyrighted materials even in an unserved market.117
American observers, however, are generally surprised that the
information in the program schedules was protectable under the Irish
copyright law. In the United States, such material would be considered
“factual” and consequently unprotectable.118 Indeed, it appears that this
kind of information would not be protectable under the laws of most of
the member states of the European Union either.119 The intriguing aspects
of the Magill ruling, however, concern the extent to which the exclusive
rights conferred by intellectual property protection can be deemed to confer a
dominant position on the rights holder, with a concomitant obligation upon the
rights holder to license others to use those rights.
The Court of Justice has recognized that the imposition upon an
intellectual-property rights holder of an obligation to deal would
effectively negative the exclusivity conferred by the intellectual property.
On that rationale, the Court upheld Volvo’s right to refuse to license
independent parts manufacturers to produce parts over which Volvo held
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design rights.120 Yet the issue is at the core of the litigation in IMS Health.
The latter case involved the right to use a scheme for the classification of
data relating to the use of pharmaceutical products that had been
developed by IMS in connection with information-collecting activities that
it was conducting for pharmaceutical companies. IMS was the only
company collecting that kind of information on a regional basis in
Germany. Its information-collection system involved the use of a large
number of small geographical categories or units in which the information
was kept. When rival information-collection companies tried to compete
with IMS, they discovered because the pharmaceutical companies were
already invested in using the IMS classification system, they could not
effectively compete unless they could use that classification system also.
Taking the view that the IMS’ classification was a de facto industry
standard to which rivals were entitled to access, the Commission initially
sided with the rivals, ordering IMS to license the competitors to use its
classification system, pending a final decision by the Commission. As of
this writing, the Court of First Instance has vacated the Commission’s
interim order. But we do not as yet have a final decision on IMS’s
obligation to license.
Valentine Korah views the Commission’s interim order in IMS as
an extension of Magill, in that the license was ordered in Magill to enable
the entrant to meet an unserved demand, while in IMS, the license was
ordered to enable new entrants to compete with an incumbent that was
already supplying the desired product.121 Because Korah appears to view
Magill as an “exceptional” inroad into intellectual property rights,122 her
unease with IMS is not surprising.123 Yet, as discussed below, it is not clear
that the results in Magill and IMS would not be duplicated in the
American legal system, albeit by different routes.
Magill and IMS deal with the intersection of intellectual property
and competition laws. For that reason, the issues raised by these cases
resonate in American law. Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s clarification
120
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of the law governing the protectability of directories, one American court
had ruled that the informational content of a telephone directory should
be made available to a rival publisher under the essential facilities
doctrine,124 a decision similar to Magill. After the Feist decision, however,
such an invocation of the essential facilities doctrine would be
unnecessary in that type of case. Even so, there are other contexts in which
American courts might sometimes act in ways that resemble the actions of
the European Commission. In its Kodak decision,125 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit effectively imposed an obligation upon an
intellectual-property rights holder to supply parts to competitors. In that
case, independent servicing organizations that wanted to service Kodak
high-speed copiers and micrographic equipment were impeded from
doing so because Kodak had refused to sell them replacement parts. In
subsequent antitrust litigation, Kodak defended its refusal, partially on
the ground that some of the parts were patented and that its refusal was
condoned by the patent law. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Kodak’s
refusal was presumptively lawful, but nonetheless ruled against Kodak on
the ground that the jury had implicitly found that its assertion of patent
rights was merely a “pretext” for violating the antitrust laws. The Ninth
Circuit’s approach was later rejected by the Federal Circuit in a similar
case involving the Xerox Corporation on the ground that it undermined
intellectual property protections by making them dependent upon the
subjective intent of the rights holder.126 The Federal Circuit, accordingly,
ruled that the patent laws conferred upon Xerox a right to refuse to supply
protected replacement parts to independent service organizations and that
the copyright laws gave it the right to refuse to supply copyrighted
manuals to the independent service organizations.
The litigation in both the European Union and the United States
raise issues of the extent to which competition-law policies will be
employed to override intellectual property protection. The European cases
show that the authorities there are troubled by this complex issue and yet
remain puzzled as to its proper resolution. The Commission appears to be
124
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aggressively pursuing competition law at the expense of intellectual
property rights in both the Magill and IMS cases, while the Court of First
Instance appears to be attempting to limit Magill. In the United States, a
close analogue to the Magill case would not arise because the underlying
information would not be protectable.127 But it is not entirely clear how an
analogue to IMS would be decided. The Seventh Circuit has protected a
taxonomy of dental procedures from copying, while indicating that the
categories themselves could be freely used by dentists and others.128 In a
similar case, the Ninth Circuit also upheld the copyright in a taxonomy of
medical procedures, while indicating that copyright would not be
permitted to deny access to a classification system that had become an
industry standard.129 These cases suggest, but do not decide, that pure
IMS-type issue might be resolved in the United States in favor of the
rivals’ claims for access under the copyright laws themselves.
The American law differs significantly from the European law,
however, because the limits on intellectual property more-often-than-not
arise under the intellectual property laws, thus avoiding a clash with the
antitrust laws. American copyright law is deeply influenced by principles,
traditions, and even specific statutory provisions that deny protection to
the utilitarian,130 that exclude from protection ideas and systems,131 and
that treat accessibility to a system as a positive value.132 In addition, the
American intellectual-property laws have incorporated their own
competition policy concerns in their misuse doctrines. As a result, the
potential conflicts between intellectual property laws and antitrust laws
are reduced. Even where these two sets of laws facially conflict, antitrust
127
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law is being construed to respect intellectual property concerns. In the
Microsoft case,133 for example, the District of Columbia Circuit allowed
antitrust law to trump copyright law in those instances in which the Court
determined that a substantial copyright policy would not be undermined,
but allowed copyright law to trump antitrust law where a substantial
copyright policy would otherwise be jeopardized.134 Indeed, there appears
to be an emerging synthesis of of intellectual-property and antitrust laws
in which the long-term goals of intellectual-property law are increasingly
respected.135
An American-type synthesis of intellectual-property and
competition law is more difficult in Europe, because the European Union
currently possesses a Union-wide competition law, but only national
intellectual property laws. As a result, it is more difficult for the varying
national intellectual-property policies to be incorporated into the
construction of Union-wide competition law. And it is also difficult, albeit
not impossible, for the national courts to incorporate European
competition-policy concerns into their national intellectual property laws.
These impediments to the harmonization, within Europe, of the
intellectual property laws with competition laws means that the
interactions of these two sets of laws is likely to produce a less than
efficient result. Because competition laws exist on a Union-wide scale and
are enforceable by Union institutions, conflicts are likely to be resolved in
favor of the competition laws, thus sacrificing the longer-term goals of
intellectual-property laws to the shorter-term focus of competition law.
3. Ramifications for the Misuse Doctrine.--This new emphasis on
efficiency as permeating the analysis of tying arrangements under both
sections of the Sherman Act is likely also to influence the development of
the copyright misuse doctrine. Copyright misuse should be focusing upon
preventing copyright from diverting from its underlying purpose of
fostering creative activity. As applied to intellectual property, the misuse
doctrine would best achieve that end by incorporating an efficiency
133
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standard. The Fourth Circuit’s rejection of a rule-of-reason (and hence an
efficiency) analysis in its Lasercomb decision was a misstep. That rejection
of an efficiency standard explains the anomalous result reached by the
Ninth Circuit in its Practice Management decision. In that case the court
ruled that an exclusive-supply provision in a licensing agreement
constituted misuse, not because of anticompetitive effect of the contractual
provision, but because that kind of restraint was combined with a
copyright license. Such decisions do nothing to further the underlying
purpose of copyright law that is the creation of social value through the
encouragement of creativity. Eventually, however, the courts are likely to
modify copyright misuse doctrine in the light of their growing awareness
of how the efficiency considerations that permeate antitrust law can
further the underlying goals of copyright law as well.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL THOUGHTS.
This paper has examined the policies of governmental institutions
in the United States, Canada, and the European Community towards
innovation. It examined several discrete problem areas with a view of
developing a better understanding of how impediments to advancing
aggregate welfare develop within these several political systems. In
particular, the paper focused upon areas in which intellectual property
concerns were inaccurately analyzed by institutional actors; where
intellectual property concerns ran into conflict or potential conflict with
imbedded legal doctrines; and where those concerns were undermined by
conflicting political pressures. In addition to identifying several places in
which governmental institutions appear to be acting to impede social
welfare, the paper revealed instances in which national welfare conflicts
with the aggregate welfare of a larger jurisdictional unit or with global
welfare. The paper provided a possible scenario for resolving an
apparently intractable policy conflict in the European Union between
policies favoring the free movement of goods and policies fostering
innovation. Finally, the paper showed how the U.S. courts are gradually
attaining a sophisticated understanding of intellectual property concerns
and using their new awareness to rationalize several substantive areas of
law impinging upon intellectual property rights;and places where judicial
institutions are actually improving their levels of analysis

